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COMMEMORATIVE ESSAYS

THE CONFLICTS AND STATE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER
THE WARSAW CONVENTION, THE HAGUE PROTOCOL
AND THE GUADALAJARA CONVENTION
By

JULIAN

G.

GAZDIKt

HE Diplomatic Conference in Guadalajara, Mexico, in the Fall of
1961 finalized the "Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other Than the Contracting
Carrier,"' which was signed on September 18, 1961.
The preamble of the Convention states its object. The states signatory
to the Convention, noting that the Warsaw Convention' does not contain
particular rules relating to international carriage by air performed by a
person who is not a party to the agreement for carriage, found it desirable
to formulate rules to apply in such circumstances.
When ratified, the new Convention will operate in conjunction with
the Warsaw Convention and with the Hague Protocol3 amending this
Convention and will have bearing on many aircraft charters and interchanges.
The Conference in Guadalajara in 1961 was not unmindful of certain
conflicts that might arise after the new Convention comes into force.4
Some of the apparent conflicts were eliminated in the course of the sessions. The suggestion' to insert a general provision in the new Convention
to the effect that in case of conflict between the Warsaw Convention and
the new Convention, the provisions of the Warsaw Convention should
prevail was, however, not accepted by the Conference. Nor was an
alternative suggestion adopted that the Guadalajara Convention should
have precedence over the Warsaw Convention in the event of conflict.
Both of these principles are recognised in international law but while the
Conference realized the possibility of conflicts, in the absence of a generally acceptable solution the matter was left for the Courts to tackle
when the occasion arises.
I.

THE HAGUE PROTOCOL CONFLICT

A cursory examination of the problem indicates that conflicting treaty
obligations if any, are not limited to the Guadalajara Convention but
could be also considered under the Hague Protocol to amend the Warsaw
Convention. As it is expected that in the near future the Hague Protocol
will become effective, certain states will have both the Protocol-amended
Warsaw Convention, and the unamended Convention in their legal systems.
It is expected that other states, at least for the time being, will only have the
t Advocate, Canadian Bar; Lecturer, Institute of International Air Law, McGill University,
Montreal.
'ICAO Doc. 8181.
2 Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air, signed
at Warsaw, October 12, 1929.
a Protocol to amend the Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international
carriage by air, signed at the Hague, September 28, 1955.
'ICAO Guadalajara Doc. 12.
5Id. at 49.
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original Warsaw Convention. One cannot help wondering what will be
the position of the passenger in this dual system. What law will be the
proper law determining the liability of the carrier? Will the question of
jurisdiction be affected? Will there be any conflict of Treaty obligations
of the states involved, and will the claimant or the defendant be able to
take advantage of such conflicts, if any? What part will the private international law rules of the state play in the jurisdiction where the action
is taken?
It may be presumptuous to attempt to answer these questions, but it
will be convenient to examine some of the problems by envisaging
hypothetical cases.
HYPOTHETICAL CASE NO. 1. A passenger enters into a contract
with an airline registered in state A, to be carried to state C; partly by
an airline registered in state A, partly by an airline registered in state B
and partly by another airline registered in state C. State A and state B
have both ratified the Hague Protocol but state C did not.
In principle, the unamended Warsaw Convention may apply to the
carriage because Article 18 of the Protocol clearly determines its applications and provides that the Convention "as amended by this Protocol shall
apply to international carriage as defined in Article 1 of the Convention,
provided that the places of departure and destination referred to in that
Article are situated either in the territories of two parties to this Protocol
or within the territory of a single party to this Protocol with an agreed
stopping place within the territory of another State."
The nationality of the passenger or the nationality of the carrier may
not matter. Nor may the fact that the action is taken in state A, state
B or state C have bearing on the case, provided that the Court has jurisdiction. Article 18 of the Protocol, with its geographical test, appears to
avoid the conflict itself although certain states have found it necessary to
include in the enabling legislation to the Warsaw and to the Protocol
express language to the effect that the provisions of the Convention are
to apply irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft performing that
carriage.
The only conflicting treaty obligation that can be envisaged might be
the one between state A and state B but it is surmised that state B having
ratified the Hague Protocol may be estoped by its terms from claiming
its application. The fact that there will be a duality of international legal
systems applicable to air carriage does not necessarily cause conflict.
This is true, however, only if the unamended Convention remains in
existence side by side with the Protocol. If state A or state B denounce
the Warsaw Convention, under the terms of Article 24(3), the situation
might completely change. Carriage from state A to state C, -not being
Protocol carriage, might not be under any international regime.
While this may not be intended by certain proposed legislations implementing the Hague Protocol, there is reason to believe that this could be
the result, unless the validity of the Warsaw Convention, within its
geographical scope, is carefully protected.
HYPOTHETICAL CASE No. 2. The circumstances are the same as before but state A and state C both ratified the Protocol and state B did
not. Under the terms of the Protocol, the passenger having the nationality
aForrest, Carriage by Air: The Hague Protocol, 10 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 726 (1961).
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of states A, B or C should in principle, all come under the regime of the
Protocol-amended Convention, whatever their nationality or the nationality of the carrier performing the carriage under the contract.
Naturally this principle will apply only in state A and state C which
have ratified the Protocol. In these same jurisdictions it is not inconceivable however, that a claimant having the nationality of state B might
raise the question of conflict of treaty obligations between state B and
state A or C with which the relations of state B are governed under the
Warsaw Convention. Conversely the carrier registered in State B might
do the same in order that he might avail himself of the lower Warsaw
limits.
The first observation is that Article 18 of the Protocol, useful as it is
to determine the application of the Protocol under the applicable laws
of the forum, may not necssarily help to overcome the difficulty of conflicting treaty obligations.
The second observation is that while the conflict of law rules in force
in the jurisdictions (state A and C) may have bearing on the legal position of the claimant or defendant, they will not help much to resolve
this question of conflicting treaty obligations.
In this hypothetical case, both states A and C are parties with state B
to a treaty that conflicts with the treaty in existence between themselves,
and the only question to determine is whether, under the rules of international law, state B could or could not insist upon full compliance with
the pre-existing treaty obligations with either state A or C.' It is easy
to answer this question in principle, in the affirmative. There may be,
however, considerations that may mitigate against this strict position.
No state would knowingly give effect to a Treaty, multilateral or
bilateral, that might be in conflict with a previously existing treary obligation, but possibility of such conflict can arise. In order to avoid the conflict the state may resort to the maxim, lex posterior derogat priori.' It
may be reasonable to apply this maxim, although it is not an accepted
international law principle, to conflicting treaty obligations under the
Warsaw Convention and the Protocol.
In this connection one should first bear in mind that the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol are multilateral treaties. In accordance
with its provisions, any state can ratify a multilateral Convention and it
need not obtain consent to that effect nor acceptance from the other states
who are signatories to the Convention or who might be entitled to adhere
to it. The unilateral act of ratification of the individual state automatically
brings the Treaty into operation with respect to the ratifying state, provided of course, that the required number of ratifications for effectiveness of the Treaty has been already achieved. Subsequently and as the
result of ratifications by other states or the lack of such ratifications, the
same state might find itself in conflict with its earlier treaty obligations
with other states, who have signed the new Convention and are also
under the regime of the old Convention but decide not to ratify the new
Convention. It is submitted that this situation may provide an excuse for
the state alleged to have violated its previous treaty obligation-at least
as regards other states who also signed the later treaty.
7

8

Schwarzenberger, I International Law 475 (3d ed. 1957).
Id. at 472.
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One should also consider that these Conventions deal with civil rightsproperty rights of individuals and not rights and obligations of states
towards each other. These Conventions are not political treaties but
rather they are non-political or commercial treaties.! The difference may
not be of great importance but it is sufficient to distinguish in the delicate
field of state obligations and the manner in which such obligations might
be enforceable. The state ratifying an international convention dealing
with private rights undertakes certain obligations but the nature of these
obligations is not necessarily the same as that of obligations of the states
arising out of political treaties requiring an act or conduct on the part
of the state.
In the former it might seem that a state has fulfilled its obligation under
the international treaty once it has ratified the treaty or enacted the required legislation to make it effective in its territory. It might be difficult
to believe that a state could then be effectively accused of having violated
its obligations under the treaty merely because, subsequently, conflicts
arise under a new multilateral treaty. And the conflict may be due only
to an adherence or ratification by another state.
The most important practical consideration is, however, the fact that
treaties are governed only partly by the principles of international law.
To a large extent they are determined by municipal law. International
law governs the relations of the states, inter se, and under English law
determines the validity, the interpretation and the enforcement of treaties
as between the parties. Municipal law, on the other hand, determines the
effects of treaties upon persons within the allegiance of the states who
are parties to such treaties."
Some treaties may require that the domestic law of the state should
be changed. In that event the Treaty is not performed until the appropriate legislation is enacted. At least in Canada the Treaty itself is not
equivalent to an Imperial Act and without the sanction of Parliament,
the Crown cannot alter existing law by entering into contract with a
foreign power."
In this respect the Canadian law seems to be somewhat different from
United States law, where by an express provision in the Constitution,
treaties duly made are the supreme law of the land "equally with Acts
of Congress duly passed" and as such they are cognizable before both
Federal and State Courts.12
Not every Treaty requires legislation in Canada. However, treaties do
require legislation when they affect private rights or when they involve
a change in the law of the land or when they involve action which is
not in the ordinary scope of the discretionary power of the Executive. 3
The Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and the Guadalajara
Convention are all subject matters that require special legislation in Canada
and the right of the claimants and the defendants will be determined
under the terms of the Statutes implementing such treaties.
There is no uniformity among states as to the form in which inter" Matas, Treaty Making in Canada, 1947 Can. B. Rev. 460.
'°6 Halsbury 519 (2d ed. 1948).
"Arrow River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co. v. Pigeon Timber Company Limited, [1932]
S.C.R. 495, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 250.
12 63 C.J. Treaties § 3 (1933).
ia Matas, supra note 9, at 458.
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national treaties are to be made effective. In some states ratification is all
that is required to make a treaty the law of the land; in others, as in
Canada, enabling legislation is required before the treaty becomes operative. In either case it might seem that states have completed their obligations once they have made the international treaty effective in their respective jurisdictions.
It is submitted that the scope of the Courts in the various jurisdictions
will be limited by the ratification or enabling legislation.' When there
is conflict between the treaty and the Statute putting it into force, the
provisions of the Statute will prevail. In these circumstances it is doubtful
that the claimant or defendant could effectively raise before the courts
the conflict in treaty obligations or the resulting breach of duty under
the Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol. This does not mean that
the conflicts between treaty obligations are absolutely without remedy.
It is possible though not probable that a state may be persuaded by the
interested party to insist on strict compliance with the terms of the treaty.
In that event the state may, of course, avail itself of the required means
of settling disputes in international law.
It is conceivable that the solution to conflicts between the Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Protocol is sought by exercising the right to
renounce the Warsaw Convention (Art. 24(3) of the Protocol). It is
easy to show how unsatisfactory a solution this might be. It would attack
the large measure of valuable uniformity that already exists in this field
of private air law. Instead of avoiding conflicts it would create new ones."
Surely the avoidance of some possible technical breaches of treaty obligations will not warrant such a drastic step.
Hypothetical Case No. 3. If the action is taken in state B, whether
the court will apply the Protocol to the carriage between state A
and state C in the above circumstances will depend on the applicable
private international law rules. Conflicting treaty obligations do not arise
because state B is under Warsaw Convention obligations with respect to
both states A and C.
In conclusion, theoretical as it may be, it is not inconceivable that a
state which has ratified the Warsaw Convention but has not ratified the
Protocol may exercise its rights under the existing Warsaw Convention
and object to the application of the Protocol to its national in a jurisdiction which has ratified both the Warsaw Convention and the Protocol.
Such intervention presumably might only take place after all recourse before the courts of the respective jurisdictions is exhausted and then again,
only if the person is able to convince its state to intervene on his behalf.
The effectiveness of such intervention, in the circumstances, may well be
lessened by the fact that his own state has been one of the signatories of
the Hague Protocol, if that is the case.
II. THE GUADALAJARA CONFLICT
Having considered the co-existence of the Protocol and the Warsaw
Convention, we may now turn to the situation when, in addition to these
two, the Guadalajara Convention will also be in effect and may come into
play. It is easy to envisage the problem. The air carriage may involve
Netti, The Treaty Enforcement Power in Federal Constitutions, 1950 Can. B. Rev. 1051.
" Makiewicz, Conflicts between the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, 3 Revue
Ginirale de 1'Air 239 (1956).
14
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points in the territories of three states, all of which have ratified the
Guadalajara Convention but only the first and third have ratified the
Protocol. It is obvious that the "actual carrier" performing part of the
carriage between the first and second states may be under a different
regime than the "contracting carrier" contracting for the entire journey.
Under Article 2 of the Guadalajara Convention, if the "actual carrier"
performs the whole or part of the carriage which, according to the agreement for carriage with the passenger or shipper, is governed by the Warsaw Convention, both the "contracting carrier" and the "actual carrier"
shall be subject to the rules of the Warsaw Convention. But Article 2
also provides that the "contracting carrier" shall be subject to the rules
of the Warsaw Convention for the whole of the carriage contemplated in
the agreement and that the "actual carrier" shall be governed by these
rules solely for the carriage which he performs.
In the event that the contract of carriage provides for carriage between points in states which have ratified the Protocol and the "actual
carrier" performs part of the carriage between points, one or both of
which is in a state which did not ratify the Protocol, the "actual carrier"
may claim the application of the Warsaw rule, whereas the passenger or
shipper's interest may be to apply the Protocol rule with the much higher
liability limits.
The application of the Warsaw Convention to the "actual carrier"
may be justified with Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention which provides in substance that any action for damages, however founded, could
only be brought subject to limitations and conditions of the Warsaw
Convention. The passenger, on the other hand, could claim that he has
contracted under the regime of the Protocol and that the Protocol applies
automatically provided that its requirements regarding geographical scope
(Article 18) are fulfilled. Hence there is a dilemma created by the
Guadalajara Convention resulting in apparent duality of obligations of
states which have ratified all three Conventions regarding other states
which have not done so. The first state has Warsaw obligations regarding
the second and Protocol obligations regarding the third. When the
Guadalajara Convention applies both state obligations are activated, and
as the result there may be apparent conflicts between treaty obligations
due to:
(i)
the fact that there is a distinction in the Guadalajara Convention
regarding the "contractual carrier" and the "actual carrier,"
whereas there is no such distinction in either the Protocol or the
Warsaw Convention.
(ii)
the fact that under the Guadalajara Convention both the Protocol and the unamended Warsaw Convention might apply simultaneously, one being applicable to the "actual carrier" and the
other to the "contracting carrier."
(iii)
the fact that in some jurisdictions the Warsaw Convention is
considered to apply to contractual liability only, whereas the
better view seems to be that it covers tortious and statutory
liability."":"
" Calkins, The Cause of Action

(.1959).

17Forrest, supra note 6.

under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. of Air L. & Corn. 217
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(iv)

the fact that in some jurisdictions the Warsaw Convention applies to the "actual carrier" irrespective of the Guadalajara Convention.
(v) the fact that the Guadalajara Convention does not have a provision similar to Article 18 of the Hague Protocol determining
its scope of application by applying a geographical standard.
(vi)
the fact that the interest of the claimant and the interest of the
respondent may be diagonally opposite as regards desirability of
application of the Warsaw Convention or the Protocol.
It must also be remembered that there may be further conflicts between
existing laws in these states, implementing the conventions and the
Protocol. Moreover, not only the limits of liability may cause conflict
between the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol as a result of
the application of the Guadalajara Convention, but also the provisions
relating to traffic documents, wilful misconduct and others. Accordingly
there might be many sources which could invite the consideration of possible conflicts under the three Conventions.
It is not possible in the scope of this paper to review all these possible
conflicts. For the purpose of illustrating the subject, it might be convenient again to resort to a hypothetical case; this time there are three
passengers, the first has the nationality of state A; the second of state B
land the third of state C. All three of them have contracted with the
"contracting carrier" having the nationality of state C. The journey is
from state A to a point in state B via the services of the "actual carrier"
registered in state B and from the point in state B to state C via the
services of the "contracting carrier." The accident giving rise to the action
occurs in state A. The position regarding the Warsaw Convention,
Protocol and Guadalajara Convention in this hypothetical case is that
all three Conventions are in effect and state A and state C have ratified
them all, but state B has only ratified the Warsaw Convention.
Actions against the "Actual Carrier" in State A. The first, second and
third passengers each may take actions in state A against the "actual
carrier." The wrong having been committed in state A and the action
taken there, there would be no problem of jurisdiction and it is surmised
that the Court will decide that the lex fori is the proper law.
The question of the nationality of the claimant or the defendant might
presumably not be material in the three cases above, once the question of
jurisdiction is cleared.
In order to determine the proper law, the court in state A may still
have the choice under its private international law rules. It may apply
the Guadalajara Convention and the Protocol. Then again, it is not inconceivable that it may apply the Warsaw Convention. To a large extent
the proper law will be determined, depending on the question whether
the "actual carrier" may be considered already a "carrier" under the
Warsaw Convention or only under the Guadalajara Convention.
If the court in state A will be called upon to decide whether the rules
of the Guadalajara Convention override the Warsaw Convention or not,
the maxim of "generalia speciablibus non derogant" may have bearing
on the case. Again it must be pointed out, however, that this maxim is
not generally adopted in customary international law.18
18 Schwarzenberger, supra note 7 at 472.
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Obviously there may be apparent conflicting treaty obligations between state A and B, or between state A and state C. Between states A,
B and C there is one treaty in existence (Warsaw Convention) and between states A and C there is another treaty in existence (Hague Protocol). Accordingly state A may find itself in conflict with state B if it
applies the Protocol, or with state C if it does not.
It will be incumbent upon state A to reconcile its position under two
conflicting treaties. The international law rules in this respect are not
as clear as they might be. There is the doctrine of non-recognition of
treaties inconsistent with previous treaties but this principle is not universally applied and it is recognized that a second treaty, although inconsistent with the first one, might not be held by an international court
to be invalid if it could be shown that the interests of the complaining
state are not affected at all, or that the degree to which they are affected
is slight when related to the general advantage accruing from the new
treaty."9 In order to succeed, presumably the complaining state A or C
would have to show that its interest is affected to a substantial extent
which in the circumstances is questionable to say the least.
There may be some question of conflict between treaty obligations of
states A and C, both having ratified the two treaties and the Guadalajara
Convention but the better view seems to be that on the basis of "jus
aequum" any such conflict would be eliminated. 0
In any case, these conflicts, if they arise are of the same nature as the
conflicts referred to in the second hypothetical case and the comments
made earlier regarding them apply.
Actions Against the "ContractingCarrier" in State A. In actions taken
against the "contracting carrier" by the same three passengers in state
A, the matter is somewhat simplified by the fact that all passengers have
contracts with the defendant carrier and that it has the nationality of
state C, which has ratified all three Conventions. These actions, whether
based on contract or tort are taken in the state which is the "locus delicti"
and the defendant carrier might have no basis whatsoever to seek application of other rules than the Protocol-amended Convention.
One must not overlook, however, the possibility that the second passenger might wish to take advantage of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, instead of the amended Article 25 of the Hague Protocol. In
this case then, irrespective of the fact that the jurisdiction of the court
and the applicable law is clearly determined, the possibility of conflicting
state obligations may arise. The foregoing comments regarding conflicts
in connection with the actions against the "actual carrier" would again
apply.
Actions Against the "Actual Carrier" in State C. Whilst such actions
may not be frequent, one cannot overlook the possibility.
The question of jurisdiction of state C in such case is not without
difficulty. Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention provides that "an
action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
court having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has
his principal place of business, or has an establishment by which the con'o

Oppenheim, I International Law 652 (3d ed. 1920).

oSchwarzenberger, supra note 7 at 474.
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tract has been made, or before the court having jurisdiction at the place
of destination."
Article 8 of the Guadalajara Convention extends the jurisdiction at the
option of the plaintiff, in addition to the four jurisdictions mentioned
above, to the jurisdiction of the place where the "actual carrier" is ordinarily resident or has his principal place of business.
If the "actual carrier" is under the Warsaw Convention and not under
the Guadalajara Convention, then under Article 28 he can be sued in
the jurisdictions where he is ordinarily resident or has his principal place
of business. Presumably, the place where the contract was made or the
place of destination will not give jurisdiction to the plaintiff against the
"actual carrier." If he is sued under the Guadalajara Convention, the
jurisdictions are not limited to the jurisdictions where he can be sued
under the Warsaw Convention but extended to all jurisdictions where the
"contracting carrier" may be sued.
Not only the question of forum but also the choice of law in this
situation may be more involved. It will be remembered that there are
various theories under which rights created in a foreign country might
be enforced in the jurisdiction of the forum.
In the United States, for instance, under the "obligatio" theory, tort
liability is governed by the law of the "place of wrong," i.e., the law of
the country where the alleged tort was committed."""&2 The plaintiff
owns something and he is helped to get it. This is done unless some sound
reason of public policy makes it unwise to do so."
In the United Kingdom a right of action, whether it arise from a contract governed by the law of the place or wrong, is equally the creature of
the law of the place and subordinate thereto. The terms of the contract or
the character of the subject-matter may show that the parties intended their
bargain to be governed by some other law; but prima facie, it falls under
the law of the place where it was made. And in like manner the civil
liability arising out of a wrong derives its birth from the law of the place,
and its character is determined by that law.
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong
alleged to have been committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled.
First, the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been
actionable if committed in England ...Secondly, the act must not have
been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done. 4
With the foregoing in mind it is surmised that the Court in state C
" Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws 12 (1st ed. 1947).
2Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904),

Holmes, J. stated:

"But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the
wrongful act, obviously it does not mean that the act in any degree is subject to the
lex fori, with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, it
equally little means that the law of the place of the act is operative outside its own
territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was
subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligation, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever
the person may be found . . . But as the only source of this obligation is the law of
the place of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of
the obligation . . . but equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow a
plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law for the foundation of
his case, and yet to deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his
liability that law would impose."
"aCardozo J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99 (1918).
4
philips v. Eyre, [1879] 6 Q.B. 1.
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might apply the law of state A in view of the fact that the contract was
made there and the accident occurred there.
It must be remembered that the "actual carrier" carried the passenger
between a Protocol state and a Warsaw state, hence by the terms of the
Protocol, it would not apply to such carriage. Whether or not the claimant
could, on the strength of his contract with the "contracting carrier," bring
about the application of the Protocol, would depend on the law of the
forum. This is a simple question of conflict between existing laws in the
jurisdiction. Only in the event that state C would decide to apply the
Protocol would the question of conflicting treaty obligation arise between
state B and state C.
Actions Against The ContractingCarrierin State C. These actions again
have a truly international element in that the tort that is giving rise to
the actions is committed in a foreign country (in state A).
First, again the question of jurisdiction would have to be decided and
secondly the law applicable to the tort. It may well be that the Court
might decide that the proper law is not the law of the forum but the
law of another jurisdiction, such as state A, where the contract was
made; where the act was committed which has given rise to the action, or
the country in which the claimant is or was domiciled. Should this last
point be considered by the Court in order to determine the proper law,
the nationality of the three passengers might also have a bearing on the
issue.
Should the Court decide that the proper law is its own law, then presumably the Guadalajara Convention and the Protocol would apply in view of
the fact that the Guadalajara Convention is in force and that the conditions
of Article 18 of the Protocol have been met. The same may be the case
if the Court should decide that the proper law is the law of state A which
also ratified both Conventions. Conflicting treaty obligations could only
arise in respect to the second passenger, a citizen of state B, which in this
example has not ratified nor adhered to the Hague Protocol and the
Guadalajara Convention.
Actions Against the Actual Carrier in State B. The fact that these
actions are against the carrier which did not enter into contract with the
passenger might have a bearing on the outcome of the conflict regarding
jurisdiction. The action would presumably be based on tort or delict and
not on contract. The lex loci delicti might well apply. Otherwise the
position of the "Contracting Carrier" and the "Actual Carrier" in state
B would be much the same as before the Courts of state B.
The different nationalities of the passengers could not produce a con-

flict of state obligations since state B, regarding states A and C, has only
treaty obligations under the Warsaw Convention.

If there is any conflict, the conflict exists only between various systems
of laws within the same jurisdiction and the Courts in state B would be

well equipped to deal with such conflict for the purpose of their proper law.
Actions Against the Contracting Carrier in State B. If the Court of
state B assumes jurisdiction, it might have to determine the proper law.
On the basis of its conflicts of law rules it may select the law of state A
or B or state C as the proper law. In the first and third instances the
Hague Protocol and the Guadalajara Convention might be applicable.
Some theoretical conflicts between state obligations might again be
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encountered as soon as the Guadalajara Convention applies, but might
be discarded in view of the fact that the Guadalajara Convention will in
these circumstances apply only on the basis of the law of the loci delicti
and not on the basis of the law of the Forum.
If, under its private international law rules, state B should decide that
the proper law is its own law, then the difficulties would be more obvious.
The carriage in accordance with the contract is a Protocol carriage but
in the legal system of state B the only convention that is applicable in
the circumstances is the Warsaw Convention.
Even though the delict giving rise to the action was committed in
another state, the right of action might be established in accordance with
the rules of its own law and the appropriate remedies ensue."
The measure of damages and the liability would be determined as if
the act had occurred in state B. If the Warsaw Convention was the law
of the land and if the carriage was a Warsaw carriage in accordance with
the law of the forum when the Warsaw Rules might apply notwithstanding the fact that state A and state C are both parties to the Protocol and
the Guadalajara Convention.
The conflicting treaty obligations presumably could not be invoked by
the passengers whose state ratified or adhered to the Protocol and the
Guadalajara since the state which has assumed jurisdiction has no other
treaty obligations than those under the Warsaw Convention.
In all these cases the difficulties would increase immensely if state A
or C, when ratifying the Protocol, had renounced the Warsaw Convention. In the actions taken in states A and C then the question would have
to be determined whether or not the Warsaw Convention has any application to the international carriage. The "actual carrier" might find itself
without any limitation of liability and the passenger wanting to take
advantage of a more convenient jurisdiction might have to establish
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to succeed with his
claim. The certainty and uniformity heretofore achieved would be lost.
The hypothetical cases reviewed have indicated the theoretical possibilities of:
(i)
Conflicts between the national laws implementing the Warsaw
Convention, the Hague Protocol and the Guadalajara Convention,
notwithstanding the fact that the first two determine their geographical applications.
(ii) Conflicting obligations of states arising out of these multilateral
treaties to which states have subsequently become parties.
It must be observed, however, that Article 18 of the Protocol will
probably avoid the ordinary conflict of law problems between the majority of cases, but the cases of conflicts arising if a state should renounce
the Warsaw Convention when ratifying the Protocol, theoretical as they
may sound, cannot be overlooked in view of the fact that at least two
states"e are planning to introduce legislation which, in effect, would limit
the application of the implementing legislation to Hague Protocol carriage.
In other words, the Warsaw Convention, as far as these countries are
concerned, might not be in existence. This position, if carried out, will
"Machado v. Fontes [1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
"0Canada and the United Kingdom.
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no doubt simplify some conflicts to which reference has been made
earlier but will introduce new and more difficult situations.27
While, theoretically, conflicting treaty obligations may arise under the
Protocol and the Warsaw Convention under the terms of the Guadalajara
Convention, it is submitted that they should have little or no practical
significance for the following reasons:
(i) These conflicts are theoretical rather than real.
(ii)
It would be difficult to convince a state to insist that another
state should do more under a multilateral international treaty
affecting civil rights, than to make it effective in the jurisdiction.
(iii) It would be equally difficult to seek remedy from a state which
ratified a multilateral treaty affecting the civil rights of individuals and created thereby conflict under its own laws.
(iv)
It would be difficult for a state, signatory to a later convention
which it has not yet ratified, to insist that another state, which
already ratified the convention, is in breach of a previous convention which the parties intended to amend with the subsequent
convention.
(v) It might not be easy to exercise any right under existing treaty
obligations because the scope of the courts in the various jurisdictions may not be broad enough to entertain such rights.
(vi) The applicable private international law rules would satisfactorily
resolve any conflicts in most jurisdictions.
In view of the foregoing it is hoped that no state will find it necessary
to resort to the renunciation of the Warsaw Convention in connection
with the ratification of the Protocol for the purpose of avoiding the
theoretical conflicts of state obligations.
International law rules, vague as they are, may explain the lack of
precision in this paper. It is hoped that the foregoing casual excurions,
notwithstanding the lack of experience of the writer in the complex field
of the law of conflicts and international obligations of states regarding
private law treaties, will stimulate the thoughts of those who are presently
considering the problem of ratification of the Guadalajara Convention
or the Hague Protocol and who are troubled by the thoughts of conflicts
between treaty obligations and the practical significance of such conflicts.

7 Makiewicz, supra note 15.

